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In this article I examine corporate social reporting as a form of New Governance 
regulation termed “democratic experimentalism.” Due to the challenges of regulating the 
behavior of corporations on issues related to sustainable economic development, New 
Governance regulation—which has a focus on decentralized, participatory, problem-
solving-based approaches to regulation—is presented as an option to traditional 
command-and-control regulation. By examining the role of social reporting under a New 
Governance approach, I set out three necessary requirements for social reporting to be 
effective: disclosure, dialogue with stakeholders, and the moral development of the 
corporation. I then assess current social reporting practices against these requirements 
and find significant problems. In response, I propose one option for solving those 
problems, and encourage future researchers to consider the demands of these three 
requirements and the possible trade-offs between them when attempting to find ways to 
improve social reporting practices. 
  
 3
The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as ew Governance 
Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue and Development 
 
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3 
II. Regulating Sustainable Economic Development: A New Governance Approach ........ 7 
III. Social Reporting: History and Current Status ............................................................ 17 
A. A Brief History of Social Reporting........................................................................ 17 
B. The Global Reporting Initiative ............................................................................... 20 
IV. The Three Pillars of Social Reporting: Disclosure, Development, and Dialogue. .... 23 
A. Disclosure ................................................................................................................ 25 
B. Dialogue................................................................................................................... 27 
C. Development ............................................................................................................ 30 
V. Crumbling Pillars ........................................................................................................ 35 
A. Dissembling: Failed Disclosure. ............................................................................. 35 
B. Directing: Failed Dialogue. ..................................................................................... 39 
C. Decoupling: Failed Development. ........................................................................... 41 
VI. Establishing the Pillars ............................................................................................... 43 
A. Finding a Solution: Is Mandatory Reporting the Answer?...................................... 46 
B. Objections and Reponses to Mandatory Reporting ................................................. 52 






Over the past decade corporate social reporting has established itself as a key 
element in the movement for making corporations more socially responsible. Proponents 
of social reporting claim that its use will lead to increased corporate accountability, 
greater stakeholder democracy, and ultimately corporate practices that are more 
consistent with sustainable development. The leading guidelines for use by corporations 
in preparing their social reports—the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)—recently 
released the third version of its standards with great fanfare and every year reports that 
more corporations are issuing social reports in accordance with its standards. By 2005, 
the majority of the 250 largest corporations in the world were publishing a stand-alone 
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social report.1 Also in that year, France passed legislation requiring its largest 
corporations to disclose certain information on their social and environmental 
performance.2 Overall, social reporting is on the verge of becoming a mainstream 
phenomenon.3 These developments make this an important time to assess the role social 
reporting is playing in encouraging corporations to work toward sustainable development 
and to determine if actions should be taken to place social reporting on a more 
constructive trajectory. 
 This assessment is especially important at this time because although the current 
system of voluntary social reporting in the United States and other nations may be 
improving the social performance of a few corporations, it is reasonable to have strong 
doubts that this system is having a significant impact overall. In fact, there is the real 
danger that social reporting can work against the attainment of sustainable development 
by hampering the implementation of other mechanisms that would be more effective in 
pushing us toward these goals, such as stricter regulation.4 That is, if not implemented 
appropriately, self-regulation through social reporting can allow corporations to 
                                                 
1 KPMG GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY SERVICES, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2005, at 4 & 11 (2005), available at 
http://www.kpmg.nl/Docs/Corporate_Site/Publicaties/International_Survey_Corporate_Responsibility_200
5.pdf. The average was brought down by United States corporations. One-hundred of the Global 250 
corporations are based in the United States, but only 35% of those companies published a social report. Id. 
at 11. 
2 See Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and France’s "ouvelle Regulations 
Economiques, 21 ARIZONA J. OF INT’L & COMPARATIVE L. 441 (2004). 
3 Hendrik Garz & Claudia Volk, GRI Reporting: Aiming to Uncover the Truth, at 7 (Sept. 2007), available 
at http://www.siran.org/pdfs/WestLB_GRI_reporting.pdf (stating that social reporting is “on the way to 
becoming the norm, rather than the exception” among large, public corporations”). 
4 For recent arguments that corporations’ claims of social responsibility divert attention from potentially 
more effective means of attaining truly socially responsible behavior by corporations, see ROBERT B. 
REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 
(2007); Aaron Chatterji & Siona Listokin, Corporate Social Irresponsibility, DEMOCRACY, Winter 2007, at 
52. 
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effectively escape stricter regulation; and the problems of unsustainable development that 
regulation should seek to address continue unabated.5 Based on the available evidence, 
there is little reason to believe that social reporting meets its ideal purpose beyond 
perhaps a handful of industry leaders. Some may claim that these criticisms are too early, 
since social reporting is still low on its developmental trajectory and that over time it will 
improve and become more effective in improving social performance. For example, 
Conley and Williams summarize the general view that social reporting must necessarily 
improve social performance over the long term because “a corporate poseur would not 
escape detection for long.”6 However, they also point out the problematic view held by 
critics that “the substance of CSR seems to be process.”7 That is one of the central 
questions addressed in this paper: Is the substance of corporate social responsibility 
through voluntary social reporting under such standards as the GRI simply an empty 
process that does not lead to any substantive changes in corporate behavior? And if so, 
what should be done about it? 
To answer these questions, I take the perspective of looking at social reporting as 
a form of regulation through networked governance. Because firms face unique 
situations, there are significant challenges in regulating a corporation’s social 
performance in an effective and efficient manner through traditional command-and-
control regulatory approaches. In short, the concern is that traditional regulatory 
approaches simply seek to achieve corporate compliance with minimal standards that 
                                                 
5 See William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 
(2003). 
6 John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the 
Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2005).  
7 Id. at 5. 
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apply to all corporations regardless of their capabilities. Such an approach, some argue, 
has a tendency to push corporations to “leav[e] rationality, innovativeness, and societal 
interests behind.”8 Governance-based regulation seeks to overcome these problems 
through flexible regulation that involves the participation of civil society actors in the 
process of encouraging corporate experimentation on sustainability strategies and holding 
corporations accountable for their performance against jointly determined goals. If 
implemented appropriately, social reporting plays a key role in this form of governance 
regulation.  
In this paper, I establish what is necessary for corporate social reporting to 
achieve its goal of improving the social performance of corporations and encouraging 
corporations to work toward sustainable economic development. The necessary 
requirements that I identify are based on so-called “New Governance” regulatory 
approaches. These interrelated requirements—disclosure of material information, 
dialogue with stakeholders, and the moral development of the corporation—form the 
three pillars supporting effective use of social reporting as a New Governance regulatory 
mechanism. Each pillar alone can serve as a justification for social reporting as a 
mechanism to improve the social performance of corporations, but effective 
implementation requires the establishment of all three pillars. Identifying these pillars 
enables us to better evaluate current practices—including drawing on existing empirical 
literature not directly related to social and environmental disclosures by corporations—
and provides more focus to our exploration of the ways to improve social reporting. In 
addition, this approach allows us to see the relationships between these three aspects of 
                                                 
8 Wade-Benzoni et al., Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based "egotiations: The Role of Values and 
Institutions, 27 ACAD. MGMT REV. 41, 48 (2002). 
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social reporting and understand how attempts to improve performance on one pillar 
through external interventions may affect (negatively or positively) the other pillars. This 
understanding is necessary because although a corporation acting in good faith may be 
able to voluntarily meet the requirements of all three pillars simultaneously, there is an 
issue of whether we can “force”—through institutional pressures or government 
mandates—all corporations to do so in an attempt to broaden the impact of social 
reporting as a form of regulation. For example, would external interventions require that 
trade-offs between the three pillars be made, and, if so, would the trade-offs allow social 
reporting to achieve its full potential? These are all questions that need to be addressed as 
we consider the future of the social reporting under guidelines such as the GRI and 
whether or not nations should make social disclosure mandatory. Overall, the approach 
developed here allows us to conduct a more comprehensive and systematic analysis of 
social reporting and its potential for having a significant impact on the private sector’s 
progress toward sustainable development. After identifying the pillars, I review the 
evidence suggesting that these pillars are not being met by current practices and then 
discuss how mandatory reporting may solve many of these problems. 
II. Regulating Sustainable Economic Development: A ew Governance 
Approach 
The goal of corporate social reporting under such guidelines as the GRI9 is to 
ensure that corporations are working toward becoming “sustainable enterprises,” which 
can be defined as corporations that “contribute to sustainable development by delivering 
                                                 
9 The GRI refers to reports issued under their guidelines as “sustainability reports” and states the goal of 
these reports as furthering “sustainable development.” Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines 3 (2006), available at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-
BFF2-5F735235CA44/0/G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf. 
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simultaneously economic, social, and environmental benefits.”10 The World Council for 
Economic Development developed the most well-known definition of sustainable 
development, which is “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”11 This definition 
does not place economic development in conflict with sustainability, but recognizes that 
economic growth is necessary to meet both the “needs of the present” and the needs of 
“future generations.” To be sustainable, however, economic growth must be guided by 
principles of environmental integrity and social equity.12 
Using regulation to achieve sustainable economic development faces significant 
challenges. The failings of traditional, command-and-control regulation have been 
covered extensively in the legal literature and include arguments of inefficiency, over-
deterrence, normative legitimacy, significant time delays in responding to new harms or 
changing societal expectations, limitations of enforcement (e.g., discovery of compliance 
failures), and focusing only on minimal, technical compliance with regulatory standards 
rather than encouraging corporations to work toward higher goals that their capabilities 
make attainable.13 At the other extreme, markets have well-known failings of their own. 
Simply stated, the general concern is that “private markets cannot be relied on to give 
appropriate weight to public interests over private ones without active public 
                                                 
10 Stuart L. Hart and Mark B. Milstein, Creating Sustainable Value, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 56, 56 (2003).  
11 WORLD COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).  
12 WORLD COUNCIL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 11, at 40; Robert W. Kates et al., What is 
Sustainable Development?, ENVIRONMENT, April 2005, at 8, 11. 
13 For general reviews of these criticisms, see David Hess, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, in 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (JOSÉ ALLOUCHE, ED.) 154, 158-63 (2006); CHRISTINE PARKER, THE 
OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 8-12 (2002). 
 9
involvement.”14 In response to the shortcomings of both markets and traditional 
regulation, a new approach is needed to complement, and in some cases replace, 
traditional regulation. That general category of approaches may be termed “New 
Governance” regulation,15 and is touted as a “third way” between command-and-control 
regulation and markets.16 
New Governance is a broad term that covers various regulatory innovations 
focused on decentralized, participatory, problem-solving approaches to regulation, as 
opposed to traditional regulation’s focus on centralized dictation of rules developed by 
experts with state-imposed penalties for noncompliance.17 This alternative approach to 
regulation is receiving support and consideration from across the political spectrum and 
in a variety of fields of law.18 In general, the increasing popularity of this approach 
results from beliefs that society is too complex, dynamic, and unpredictable for 
traditional regulatory approaches.19 In response to some of the problems identified above, 
its proponents believe that it has significant advantages over traditional regulation in 
simultaneously promoting both economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy.20 
Because New Governance is an emerging regulatory approach that is appearing in a 
variety of policy domains, there are differences (as well as basic confusion) about the 
                                                 
14 Lester M. Salamon, The "ew Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 1611, 1635 (2001). 
15 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “"ew Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as 
Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 471 (2004–2005). 
16 Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 442-43 (2004).  
17. Karkkainen, supra note 15, at 472-74. 
18 Lobel, supra note 16, at 343-45. 
19 Id. at 357-58.  
20 Id. at 443. 
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theoretical underpinnings, which in some cases can lead to significant differences in 
implementation.21 Here, I focus primarily, though not exclusively, on an approach 
referred to as “democratic experimentalism.”22  
In general, this experimentalist governance approach seeks to take advantage of 
local knowledge and encourage experimentation to find tailored solutions to complex 
problems.23 The role of the government is to “orchestrate” this process, rather than dictate 
top-down rules. As part of this orchestration, the government must encourage broad 
participation at the local level that involves input from a variety of actors that are affected 
by the actions and that have differing perspectives on the problem as well as different 
areas of expertise.24 Through experimentation, these actors can attempt to find the best 
solution to a problem that takes into account the relevant aspects of that unique situation 
(e.g., the situation of a specific corporation, an industry, an issue, or geographic area). 
Any solutions developed from experimentation are understood to be provisional and will 
be updated based on new knowledge and changing circumstances or societal 
expectations.25 In the administrative law context, Dorf and Sabel refer to this as “rolling 
best-practice rules.”26 That is, as some threshold level of regulated entities demonstrate 
                                                 
21 Karkkainen, supra note, at 478 (stating that “in its sheer novelty, the recent profusion of New 
Governance scholarship has not yet settled upon a common nomenclature, leaving even the most dedicated 
reader with the daunting task of sorting through and translating a bewildering babel of unfamiliar, 
competing, and possibly incompatible terminology, which may or may not describe similar phenomena in 
different terms, or different phenomena in similar terms.”) 
22 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
267 (1998). 
23 Lobel, supra note 16. 
24 Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s "ew Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 645, 677-79 (2006). 
25 Id. at 679-80. 
26 Dorf and Sabel, supra note 22, at 350-51. 
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that certain performance goals are attainable, those goals become the minimum 
acceptable standard for others.27 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Project XL provides one example 
of this type of regulation.28 Under this project, corporations can receive waivers on a 
range of regulatory requirements related to emissions of pollutions in exchange for 
developing organizational practices that will produce “superior environmental 
performance” overall.29 The regulatory body provides participating corporations with an 
amount of flexibility that they would not have had under existing command-and-control 
legislation in the hope that those corporations will develop and utilize new management 
techniques or technological innovations to provide superior results. To gain approval for 
their proposals and obtain the waivers, corporations must negotiate the terms of their 
project with federal and state agencies, as well as with interested stakeholder groups. A 
typical negotiated term required that the goals of the project be responsive to any 
significant changes in circumstances or new information impacting the project.30  
Project XL was a progressive attempt at encouraging experimentation, but 
ultimately it failed to produce a significant number of projects and was halted by the EPA 
in 2003. There are many potential explanations for the failure of Project XL. Professor 
Freeman identifies poorly structured stakeholder participation mechanisms and the 
significant authority granted to corporations to determine the extent of stakeholder 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 382-85. 
29 Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 55 (1997). 
30 Id. at 55-56. 
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participation.31 Professors Dorf and Sabel point to the inability of participants in one 
project to learn from the outcomes and experience of another project, which also 
prevented stakeholders from being able to benchmark successes.32 Overall, Project XL’s 
design failures prevented it from achieving the hoped for collaborative commitment to 
experimentalism.33 
Among the lessons of Project XL’s failures is the recognition of the importance of 
transparency. Transparency accomplishes two things. First, it ensures accountability. 
Accountability is the “expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, 
feelings, and actions to others,” and those “that do not provide a satisfactory justification 
for their actions will suffer negative consequences.”34 In the context of this paper, the 
“others” are those parties participating in the governance exercise. Second, transparency 
furthers experimentation by allowing local actors to identify evolving best practices from 
other similar situations and then adapting those practices to meet their needs.35 Thus, a 
key orchestration role for the government is directing the collection and dissemination of 
information to allow corporations and stakeholders in different locales to learn from each 
other and engage in benchmarking.36 
                                                 
31 Id. at 77-81. 
32 Dorf and Sabel, supra note 22, at 383-88. 
33 Id. 
34 Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCH. 
BULLETIN 255, 255 (1999). Those that provide “compelling justifications” may enjoy positive 
consequences. Id. See also Rubin, supra note 40, at 2119 (“As used in ordinary language, accountability 
refers to the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions 
and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation.”). 
35 Kruse, supra note 24, at 680. 
36 Dorf and Sabel, supra note 22, at 383-84.  
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One example of the use of transparency in this area is the Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI), which requires companies to report their plants’ emissions of certain toxic 
chemicals to the Environmental Protection Agency, which makes the information 
public.37 Through these disclosures, governments and interested stakeholders can both 
hold companies accountable for their actual performance and use the comparative data to 
establish appropriate benchmarks for performance goals. Some states passed laws to 
expand the TRI and require corporations to file annual reports that show how their 
performance has changed from past years, explain the cause of any change, and discuss 
organizational plans to reduce the use of toxic chemicals.38 This is an attempt to more 
directly involve corporations in finding potential solutions and providing additional 
information to stakeholders. It is important to note that the TRI does not establish 
performance goals (e.g., emissions levels), but only provides information to any 
potentially interested stakeholders. Thus, an important regulatory goal of the TRI is “to 
induce firms and citizens to acquire information that reveals problems and possibilities 
for their solution.”39 
Corporations, of course, play a central role in this experimentation toward 
workable solutions for problems related to sustainable development. New Governance 
regulation recognizes not only that corporations have an information advantage over 
other participants with respect to their capacities and experiences with these issues, but 
also that any rule—whether it comes out of a stakeholder dialogue or a centralized 
                                                 
37 The TRI is part of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act in the United States. 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, §§ 301–30, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50 
(1994). 
38 See Dorf and Sabel, supra note 22, at 379-81 (discussing the Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act 
(TURA)).  
39 Id. At 380. 
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government command—cannot be implemented effectively without the firm playing a 
central role.40 As an example, consider the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which 
offer corporations reduced penalties for criminal violations if they had implemented an 
“effective” compliance and ethics program before the violation occurred. The Guidelines 
set out essential features of an effective program, but the corporation is free to implement 
those general features based on its own unique situation. In addition, this regulatory 
approach recognizes that corporations’ strategies for compliance with the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines (or any rule or norm) “will be most effective if the firm or 
individual internalizes them, that is, absorbs them into its meaning structure so that they 
become part of its mode of operation or existence.”41 The 2004 amendments to the 
Guidelines recognized this when the requirements for a mitigated sentence were amended 
to state that in addition to an effective compliance program, corporations also must 
“promote an organizational culture that encourages ‘ethical’ conduct.”42  
New Governance legal scholars are exploring similar approaches to reduce 
employment discrimination.43 These scholars recognize that the causes of discrimination 
are often unintentionally rooted in the corporation’s culture and structural features, and 
that traditional regulatory approaches are limited in their ability to end such 
discrimination.44 Thus, the challenge the law faces is to provide external legal incentives 
for compliance with discrimination laws, as well as to support internal change initiatives 
                                                 
40 Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse, 103 MICHIGAN L. REV., 
2073, 2108-2109 (2005). 
41 Id. at 2109. 
42 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §8B2.1(a)(2) (2006). 
43 See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). 
44 Id. at 465-69. 
 15
that may be unique to any particular corporation and are likely to be more effective in 
ending corporate-culture based discrimination.45 Sturm frames the challenge as such: 
“How can there be external accountability without externally imposed rules? How can the 
law shape internal problem-solving processes without taking over the process of defining 
their features? How can standards of effectiveness be developed that are flexible enough 
to account for variability [among companies] and still comparable across different 
locations?”46 In her answer to these questions, Sturm argues that the law should 
orchestrate the meaningful participation of key stakeholders (e.g., non-governmental 
organizations and professional networks) to balance the need for unique local solutions 
while at the same ensuring the company complies with external norms of appropriate 
behavior.47 These stakeholders (which Sturm refers to as intermediary groups, since they 
intermediate between the law and the organizations) work directly with organizations to 
help incorporate external norms into the organization’s internal norms, to develop 
compliance programs tailored to the organization’s culture, and to develop knowledge 
that can be transferred between organizations.48 Thus, this approach seeks to develop 
experimentation toward solutions to the problem of discrimination through the 
participation of interested stakeholders, the direct involvement of the corporation, and 
transparency (as conducted by the intermediaries through the support of government 
agencies49). 
                                                 
45 Id. at 522. 
46 Id at 523. 
47 Id. At 523-24. 
48 Id. At 523-37; see also Lobel, supra note 16, at 422-23. 
49 Sturm, supra note 43, at 548-53 (discussing current problems related to transparency and providing 
suggestions for solutions). 
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Overall, rather than command-and-control’s reliance on one-size-fits-all 
regulation with centralized rule-making, appropriately structured New Governance 
regulation uses mechanisms to encourage experimentation at a more local level. This 
allows for solutions tailored to the specific needs and abilities of the regulated entity and 
its stakeholders, which are updated continuously as new information becomes available. 
This approach addresses many of the failings of command-and-control approaches listed 
earlier. As described above and based on my review of the scholarship in this area, I 
argue that any regulatory mechanism under the democratic experimentalist form of New 
Governance regulation must meet three basic requirements to succeed as a productive 
complement (or alternative) to traditional regulation: transparency, significant 
participation of interested stakeholders, and direct involvement of the regulated entity in 
determining strategies for compliance with the agreed-upon goals to ensure those 
strategies become part of the organization’s “meaning structure.”  
As can be seen in some of the examples above, not all New Governance 
regulations successfully meet these requirements. However, these requirements can 
explain why those programs fail to reach their potential. Here, I use these three 
requirements to evaluate social reporting as a form of democratic experimentalist New 
Governance regulation designed to push corporations to work toward sustainable 
economic development. I refer to these requirements as the three pillars of corporate 
social reporting: disclosure, dialogue, and development. Before further discussing those 
requirements in connection with social reporting, the next section provides a brief 
background on social reporting and the current GRI guidelines.  
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III. Social Reporting: History and Current Status 
Although there is wide familiarity with the GRI and currently issued social 
reports, many do not realize that current social reporting practices are the result of an 
evolution tracing back over 60 years. This section provides a brief history of that 
evolution and creates a background that I will touch upon throughout the paper as I 
discuss the goals of social reporting. In this section and throughout the paper I use the 
term “social reporting” (and “sustainability reporting”) to encompass the terminology of 
social accounting, auditing, and reporting, where social accounting refers to the 
measurement and collection of information, social auditing to the evaluation of a 
company’s performance against selected standards, and social reporting to the disclosure 
of that information to the public.50 Following the brief history, I provide a description of 
the GRI’s latest guidelines for producing a social report. Although this paper is about 
social reporting in general, I look closely at the GRI standards, since they are arguably 
becoming the de facto standard for social reporting today. 
A. A Brief History of Social Reporting 
Professors Carroll and Beiler trace the development of the concept of corporate 
social auditing back to the 1940s and the work of Stanford professor Theodore J. Kreps.51 
Kreps was concerned with finding ways to measure the contribution of business to the 
overall goals of our economic system, since he viewed standard profit-and-loss 
                                                 
50 David Hess, Regulating Corporate Social Performance: A "ew Look at Corporate Social Accounting, 
Auditing, and Reporting, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 307, 308 (2001). 
51 Archie B. Carroll and George W. Beiler, Landmarks in the Evolution of the Social Audit, 18 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 589, 590 (1975). Although they recognize Kreps as originator of the term in this context, they 
acknowledge that the term may have a prior history. Id.  
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accounting as inadequate.52 The goals Kreps envisioned for the economic system 
included improved health and education, increased opportunities for individuals, 
innovations, international peace, and the democratization of businesses.53 The second 
major work on social auditing appeared in the early 1950s when Howard R. Bowen 
developed a system for outside auditors to evaluate the performance of corporations on 
such matters as wages, human relations, community relations, and public relations.54 
Although the audit was to be conducted by independent auditors, it was not intended to 
be made public and was to be used solely by management.55  
These first two approaches demonstrate two distinct potential purposes of social 
reports. Kreps’ approach focused on the external evaluation of the performance of 
corporations and industries in achieving societal goals. This information was intended for 
use in public policy decisions.56 Bowen, on the other hand, sought a system that would 
provide insight to management on how well they were running their corporations, and 
external evaluation was not a goal.  
As social auditing developed in the 1970s,57 this tension between auditing for 
public use and auditing only for internal decision making remained.58 Although many 
                                                 
52 Id. at 591-93.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 593-94. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 596. 
57 Some of the major works of the 1970s included CLARK C. ABT, THE SOCIAL AUDIT FOR MANAGEMENT 
(1977); RAYMOND BAUER & DAN H. FENN, THE CORPORATE SOCIAL AUDIT (1972); DAVID BLAKE, 
WILLIAM FREDERICK & MILDRED MYERS, SOCIAL AUDITING (1976); and RALPH ESTES, CORPORATE 
SOCIAL ACCOUNTING (1976). 
58 See Raymond A. Bauer, The Corporate Social Audit: Getting on the Learning Curve, 16 CAL. MGMT. 
REV. 5, 7-8 (1973); see also SIMON ZADEK, PETER PRUZAN, & RICHARD EVANS, BUILDING CORPORATE 
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companies in the United States experimented with social audits (seventy-six percent of 
large corporations according to one survey in 1974), most did not make their reports 
public.59 In response, some external stakeholder groups experimented with developing 
their own social audits of certain corporations for their use in identifying the socially 
irresponsible ones.60 This pressure for external accountability continued to develop, and 
many executives believed that they would see government-mandated, publicly available 
social audits in the near future.61 In the 1980s, however, this momentum dissipated.62 In 
part, the blame can be placed on the recession and the elevation of business interests in 
the 1980s.63 Another major contributing factor was the reluctance of corporations to 
provide fuel for their critics.64 Thus, corporations did not produce social audits for 
internal management use since that might be viewed by shareholders as an unaffordable 
luxury, and they did not produce social audits for public use since they did not want to 
invite social criticism.65 The result was the end of significant experimentation in social 
auditing by major corporations, accounting firms, and consulting groups. 
The 1990s saw the resurgence of social reporting. Some of the drivers included 
the growing acceptance of environmental auditing and the increase in social investors and 
                                                                                                                                                 
ACCOUNTABILITY 17 (1997) (identifying the tensions between social auditing as a “management tool” or an 
“accountability mechanism”). 
59 Hess, supra note 50, at 311. 
60 Bernard L. Butcher, The Program Management Approach to the Corporate Social Audit, 16 CAL. MGMT. 
REV. 11, 13 (1973). 
61 Hess, supra note 50, at 311. 
62 Meinolf Dierkes, Whither Corporate Social Reporting: Is it Time to Legislate?, 28 CAL. MGMT. REV. 
106, 107 (1986). 
63 Hess, supra note 50, at 311; Zadek et al., supra note 58, at 18. 
64 Id. at 312. 
65 Id. at 311-12. 
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social consumers, which required information for the application of their various social 
screens.66 Social reports issued by Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Inc. and the Body Shop in 
the mid-1990s raised the profile of these practices. This was followed by the nonprofit 
organization CERES starting the “Global Reporting Initiative” (GRI) in 1997.67 In 1999, 
the United Nations Environment Program joined the GRI as a partner, the GRI released a 
draft of its reporting guidelines, and the first set of companies began reporting under 
those guidelines.68 In 2002, the GRI established itself as a separate entity from CERES, 
released its second set of guidelines, and arguably become the unofficial accepted 
standard for social reporting. In 2000, only fifty organizations released reports under the 
guidelines,69 but by spring 2007 that number was over 1000.70 Thus, corporate social 
auditing and reporting began as an idea in the 1940s and 1950s, drew growing interest in 
the 1970s, faded away in the 1980s, returned in the 1990s, and now is on the verge of 
becoming mainstream practice with the GRI leading the way.  
B. The Global Reporting Initiative 
In October 2006, the GRI issued the revised third edition of their reporting 
guidelines (G3).71 In this section, I provide a brief overview of those guidelines and what 
they require for corporations producing a social report. According to the G3, 
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“Sustainability reporting is the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being accountable 
for organizational performance toward the goal of sustainable development.”72 Likewise, 
the 2002 GRI guidelines state that: “The aim of the Guidelines is to assist reporting 
organizations and their stakeholders in articulating and understanding contributions of the 
reporting organizations to sustainable development.”73 Thus, the GRI sees its purpose as 
generally consistent with the sustainable development goals I set out above for New 
Governance regulation. 
The starting point for organizations using the G3 is to determine the content of the 
report.74 The guidelines provide certain core performance indicators that all organizations 
must report against, unless an organization determines that a specific indicator is not 
“material” for their situation.75 In addition, the guidelines provide a list of non-core 
indicators that organizations should report on if they deem them material. The guidelines 
define “materiality” as information that “reflect[s] the organization’s significant 
economic, environmental, and social impacts, or that would substantively influence the 
assessments and decisions of stakeholders.”76 In addition to materiality, the content of the 
report is determined by principles of stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability context, and 
completeness.77 Stakeholder inclusiveness requires the corporation to identify its 
stakeholders (those “significantly affected” by the organization’s activities) and report on 
                                                 
72 Id. at 3. 
73 Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 1 (2002).  
74 Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 71, at 6-7. 
75 Id. at 7. In addition, there are additional core indicators for members of certain sectors (e.g., apparel and 
footwear, electric utilities, financial services) that are published in separate supplements. 
76 Id. at 8. 
77 Id. at 7. 
 22
how the organization “has responded to their reasonable expectations and interests.”78 
The principle of completeness is designed to ensure the report presents a complete picture 
of the organization’s actual performance for stakeholders (including both negative and 
positive trends over time) and the principle of sustainability context is to ensure that the 
organization reflects on and explains how the organization is (or is not) meeting the 
demands of achieving sustainability.79 With respect to determining the quality of the 
information to be included in the report, the guidelines state principles of balance, 
comparability, clarity, accuracy, timeliness, and reliability.80 It is important to note that 
the principle of clarity requires the report to “present information in a way that is 
understandable, accessible, and usable by the organization’s range of stakeholders.”81 
This means the report should “avoid technical terms, acronyms, jargon, or other content 
likely to be unfamiliar to stakeholders” and be “comprehensible to stakeholders who have 
a reasonable understanding of the organization and its activities.”82 
The actual disclosures the guidelines require organizations to include in their 
reports fall into three categories. First, the organization should describe basic features of 
the organization (e.g., size, industry, governance), discuss how sustainability issues affect 
corporate strategy, and describe how the organization conducted the reporting process 
(e.g., the stakeholders engaged).83 Second, the organization should disclose the 
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organization’s management approach and policies related to issues in the report.84 
Finally, the organization must report on various performance indicators, which are 
organized into the categories of economic, environmental, labor practices, human rights, 
society, and product responsibility.85 
Organizations are encouraged, but not required, to comply with all parts of the 
guidelines. Once the report is completed, however, the organization should indicate the 
degree to which they did comply by selecting an application level of A, B, or C.86 A 
lower application level is meant for organizations that are relatively new to the social 
reporting process. In addition, an organization should include a “+” on their application 
level if they have used external assurance.87 
IV. The Three Pillars of Social Reporting: Disclosure, Development, and 
Dialogue. 
The ultimate goal of corporate social reporting is to improve the social 
performance of the corporations doing the reporting and ensure they are working toward 
becoming sustainable enterprises. For social reporting to achieve this goal, the process 
must rely on three important pillars: disclosure, development, and dialogue. My use of 
these three pillars comes from the democratic experimentalist form of New Governance 
regulation. These three pillars are, however, generally consistent with others’ descriptions 
                                                 
84 Id. at 24. 
85 Id. at 25-36. 
86 Id. at 5. 
87 Id. 
 24
of the use and goals of social reports. For example, in 1991 the SBN Bank in Denmark 
described their social report88 as follows: 
[A social report] provides measures of how well an organization lives up 
to the shared values to which it has committed itself. It contributes to a 
dialogue process where values become integrated into the organization. It 
provides an extensive picture of the organization's relationships with its 
stakeholders, and thus of its chances for long-term development and 
survival. But it encompasses more than just a snapshot at a particular time; 
its design, development and interpretation contribute to an ongoing 
dialogue culture where values become vital for the organization's self-
reference.89 
 
This description reflects the Bank’s belief that the organization must engage with 
their stakeholders to determine the shared values they will commit to live up to 
(dialogue), that those values must be “integrated into the organization” (development), 
and that the report provide a “picture” of the organization that allows them to be held 
publicly accountable for how well they have lived up to those shared values 
(disclosure).90 In this section, I further describe the three pillars in the context of social 
reporting. Following that discussion, Part V of this article assesses current practices under 
each pillar.  
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A. Disclosure  
The disclosure pillar requires that corporations provide their stakeholders with all 
relevant and material information related to the corporation’s social and environmental 
policies and actual performance. Although the early discussions of social auditing 
debated whether social audits should be for internal use only or public use, those arguing 
for its public use have won. Businesses are now operating in an “age of transparency.”91 
Demands for greater information on corporations’ activities come from all sectors of 
society, including shareholders, consumers, communities, special interest groups, and 
governments.  
Under a New Governance perspective, disclosure of corporations’ performance 
information is necessary to ensure accountability and to provide information that allows 
stakeholder participants to identify best practices and learn from the experiences of 
various corporations. To work toward these ends, the information should be of use to not 
just market actors, but also stakeholders in the political arena. For example, non-market 
actors need information to determine if self-regulation on a particular issue is working or 
if some other approach is required.  
The policy justification for any government intervention in this area is the 
problem of information asymmetry.92 Corporations have information that outside 
stakeholders could use to hold corporations accountable or further their learning, but 
those stakeholders either cannot gain access to the information without incurring 
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significant costs or simply do not have access to the information at all. Through 
intervention and perhaps mandated disclosure, the government cures the asymmetry 
problem and allows the interested stakeholders to act upon the information as they see fit. 
Disclosure policies will not be effective in reaching their goal if they are not 
planned appropriately. To determine the effectiveness of a transparency policy, including 
corporate social reporting, we must consider the process of how a corporation’s 
disclosure of social information results in changed behavior in the corporation. To 
understand this process, Weil and colleagues refer to an “action cycle.”93 In this cycle, 
the corporation discloses new information, stakeholders take in and process the 
information, the stakeholders then decide to alter their behavior based on the new 
information, and then corporations identify those changes and respond appropriately. A 
new set of disclosures reflecting the changed corporate behavior starts the process over 
again.  
The action cycle forces us to consider the behaviors of the users and disclosers of 
information, rather than focus simply on the information disclosed.94 To improve the 
functioning of the action cycle, we need a clear understanding of who is using the 
disclosed information and how. Thus, rather than attempting to identify indicators that 
create a general picture of a firm’s social performance and are directed at any potentially 
interested stakeholder (such as under the GRI’s principle of clarity described earlier), 
there is a strong argument to be made for focusing on the information needs of those 
stakeholders that are the actual users of the reports, such as the financial community (e.g., 
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social investors) or activist special interest groups. As discussed further below, meeting 
the needs of these users likely requires standardized and comparable data related to 
performance, such as found in financial reports or the environmental performance 
information contained in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) described earlier.95 This 
information allows stakeholders to hold corporations accountable and to determine the 
success or failure of various local “experiments” (e.g., an industry code of conduct with 
self-regulation). 
B. Dialogue  
A key aspect of democratic experimentalist New Governance regulation is its 
focus on problem-solving (and continual improvement) based on dialogue with a variety 
of stakeholders. Under traditional regulation, a centralized body of experts sets the rules, 
corporations decide whether or not to comply, and then the experts develop new rules 
based on the information that works its way up to them.96 Under New Governance 
regulation, however, corporations play an active role in setting the rules (or, more 
appropriately, the “norms”), but interested stakeholders besides just the government play 
an active role in that process as well. As stated by Lobel, under New Governance 
regulation, “The role of government changes from regulator and controller to facilitator, 
and law becomes a shared problem-solving process rather than an ordering activity.”97 
The goal is not simply to have different stakeholders represent their interests in an 
adversarial forum where each seeks to “win,” but rather to have stakeholders engaging in 
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problem-solving and consensus building.98 This collaboration applies not only to 
establishing norms and expectations, but also to ongoing monitoring of performance and 
updating of the norms and goals.99 Similar to the moral development pillar discussed 
below, corporations are more likely to comply with the norms of behavior if they have 
played a role in developing the consensus behind the norm.100 In addition, this pillar 
contributes an additional democratic value by giving a voice to those affected by an 
action.101 
This collaborative governance model applies not only to domestic issues—where 
this model has its roots from deliberative democracy ideas in political science102—but 
also to international issues related to sustainable development.103 Currently, social 
movement pressures for more responsible conduct by corporations typically do not lead 
to the type of dialogue necessary for New Governance regulation. As Fung states with 
respect to international labor standards, “Rather than civil negotiating and rights-based 
reasoning, these movements exploit scandals, utilize accusation, and exercise protest, 
while firm responses are often designed to improve press relations rather than to establish 
earnest dialogue.”104 The role of government is to ensure the existence of forums for open 
deliberations that attempt to take into account power imbalances and limit adversarial 
posturing.  
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Overall, this form of stakeholder collaboration forms the second pillar of 
corporate social reporting, which requires that corporations develop meaningful dialogues 
with their stakeholders. As part of the social reporting process, corporations should 
consult with interested stakeholders to determine their expectations and their views on the 
corporation’s performance in meeting those expectations. As discussed above, 
engagement is a key aspect of social reporting under the GRI and is fully developed 
under the principle of inclusivity. Corporations then should meaningfully reflect on those 
dialogues, determine to what extent any suggested changes should be implemented into 
corporate strategies, and then continue the dialogue through the articulation of their goals 
and the justification of their choices and performance. Not only should this process help 
companies decide what information is material (and thus should be included in their 
report under the GRI), but it also should influence the values and priorities of the firm. As 
discussed above, the SBN Bank views the dialogues conducted in constructing their 
social report as a necessary part of developing the “shared values” of the company.105 
The Shell Group views engagement with stakeholders as “the cornerstone of 
social performance,”106 and engagement has played an important role in internal audits of 
their social performance,107 as well as determining the content of their social report.108 A 
sustainable development officer at Shell states that “stakeholder engagement is about 
two-way dialogue and agreed actions. It includes involving stakeholders in the 
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identification of potential impacts and issues, and collaborative development of possible 
solutions to these and their subsequent implementation and monitoring.”109 Shell even 
states that if certain stakeholder groups do not have the capability of interacting 
meaningfully with Shell, that Shell should support the building of that capacity.110 
Regardless of one’s opinion on Shell’s progress toward adopting practices consistent with 
sustainable development, their pioneering social reporting and engagement practices have 
clearly played a key role in saving Shell’s reputation after its environmental and human 
rights crises in the mid-1990s and significantly improving its performance from that 
baseline.  
C. Development  
The ultimate goal of social reporting is, of course, to actually change corporate 
behavior in furtherance of the goal of sustainable economic development. This can occur 
through external pressures forcing the corporation to change, but it can also occur 
through a corporation’s own self-critical reflection on its behavior.111 I refer to this as the 
moral development of the corporation that occurs as the corporation goes through the 
social reporting process. This term is meant to focus on the processes and organizational 
norms that influence decision-making throughout the organization. Moral development 
refers to the incorporation of sustainability issues into the operating ethos of the 
corporation. Through self-reflection and self-criticism corporations become cognizant of 
where the corporation’s social performance falls short of its previously held beliefs and 
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societal expectations and then seek out new ways to improve their performance. In other 
words, the corporation should actually incorporate information from the social 
accounting process into operational and strategic decision making. Or, as Power states 
with respect to environmental accounting, “the re-internalization of external effects.”112 
This process should force managers to challenge their assumptions based on this new 
information. 
This notion of moral development of the corporation is consistent with the 
requirements of New Governance regulatory approaches. The New Governance approach 
understands that effective implementation of any law requires allowing the regulated 
entity to have an active role in determining its strategies for compliance with the goals of 
regulation.113 As stated earlier, the effectiveness of compliance with any rule or norm of 
appropriate behavior is significantly enhanced if the corporation “absorbs them . . . into 
its meaning structure.”114 This is different from a corporation simply being “responsive” 
to societal pressures, and instead involves the actual incorporation of ethical issues into 
strategic and operational decision making.115  
Moral development of the corporation through government intervention into 
corporate decision-making processes has a long history in the scholarship of corporate 
law reformists. Over thirty years ago, Christopher Stone, in his classic work, Where the 
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Law Ends, argued that the law should stop treating corporations as a “black box” and 
intrude into “the corporation’s decision structures and processes.”116 Stone went on to 
state that “the importance of a company’s information processes cannot be overstated; 
they are as vital to the corporation as the nervous system of a human being to the 
body.”117 If certain “softer” types of information related to a corporation’s social and 
environmental performance are not being collected, then the corporation will simply not 
be able to act effectively with respect to those issues.118 Thus, through intervention, the 
law could require the corporation to collect certain types of information, which makes it 
easily available for incorporation into decision making. More important, it forces 
managers to confront social performance issues that they otherwise would have avoided. 
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency reports that after collecting the 
information required to complete a Toxic Release Inventory report, “some companies 
expressed surprise at their own toxic chemical release amounts and set goals to improve 
their environmental performance.”119  
Suncor Energy is one company that views its social reporting practices as vital to 
putting the company on the path to sustainability.120 Suncor claims that the act of 
publishing a report containing their social and environmental targets forces the company 
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to find ways to live up to those self-imposed goals.121 In other words, the report serves as 
a motivating mechanism to put in place the changes necessary for the company to meet 
its sustainability goals. To assist in attaining those goals, the company ensures that the 
reports are included within the responsibilities of the Chief Financial Officer and that 
certain indicators are included in the company’s monthly financial reports.122 These acts 
force sustainability issues into all business decisions and place those issues consistently 
in front of the senior managers and the board of directors.123 Overall, Suncor views the 
reporting process as vital for both motivating and focusing the attention of managers, as 
well as providing the internal information necessary to determine if the company is 
making progress toward its goals.124 
Ideally, development requires that the social auditing information have an impact 
not just on the decisions of the corporate officers and directors, but all employees of the 
corporation. To impact decision making throughout the firm, corporations should have 
systems in place that ensure that feedback from the data collection process—that is, 
information on stakeholders’ concerns and appraisals of the firm’s performance, as well 
as the firm’s own appraisal of its performance—is incorporated into the firm’s policies 
and practices.125 In other words, the sustainability reporting process must actually have an 
impact on employees at all levels of the firm and allow those employees to see the 
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connection between their job performance and sustainability.126 One approach to doing 
this is working backwards from a GRI performance indicator to determine which specific 
company initiatives are necessary to attain the desired performance level that is to be 
reported.127 In many cases, performance on these initiatives then should be recognized 
and rewarded along with other financial and operational goals.128 
Ultimately, it is hoped the information collection process and the subsequent 
dissemination of information throughout the firm will lead to a positive change in the 
corporation’s culture. Underlying much of the work on social reporting related to the 
pillar of disclosure is that firms will face pressure from external stakeholders (who, with 
more information on corporate performance, are better able to apply pressure) and will 
then respond appropriately. Although there is truth to that model, it fails to recognize the 
range of firms’ responses to similar pressures, which can range from resistance to going 
beyond compliance with existing norms.129 One strong explanatory factor is culture of the 
organization.130 Thus, the development pillar should be factored into our analysis of 
social reporting. It is also important to note that the information needed to satisfy the 
demands of the development pillar may be different from that needed to satisfy the 
disclosure pillar. Reflecting the early debates on whether social auditing should be for 
internal or external audiences, moral development is primarily focused on internal 
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change. As such, the quality and character of information collected may be less precise 
and more qualitative than would be necessary to satisfy the demands of external 
stakeholders for purposes of accountability.131 
V. Crumbling Pillars 
In this part, I analyze current practices to determine if corporations are meeting 
the demands of each pillar. My analysis reviews existing empirical studies on social and 
environmental disclosure, but it also includes studies not directly related to social 
disclosure. These studies provide significant insight into determining if the current 
voluntary approach to social reporting will satisfy the requirements of the three pillars. 
A. Dissembling: Failed Disclosure. 
Firms evade their disclosure responsibilities when they engage in strategic 
disclosures that provide little insight into the complete social performance of the 
corporation. Corporations dissemble when they disclose favorable information but hide 
unfavorable information, fail to put their disclosures into the appropriate context, or 
simply provide false disclosures. In addition, dissembling can occur when corporations 
provide disclosures on policies, but fail to provide information on the actual 
implementation or effectiveness of those policies. The evidence in support of dissembling 
is significant and growing.132 The basic finding is that firms respond to their poor social 
performance or a crisis in their industry by disclosing relevant nonfinancial information, 
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but that information is overwhelmingly positive.133 Not surprisingly, one recent study of 
social disclosures by US corporations in all communications with stakeholders—
including financial filings, analysts conference calls, Web sites, press releases, product 
information sheets, and others—found that social reports and similar stand-alone reports 
(e.g., Health, Environment and Safety reports) were second only to press releases in 
having the highest ratio of favorable to unfavorable social disclosures.134 
Contrary to the quote above from Conley and Williams135 that a corporate poseur 
would not escape detection for long, apparently corporations are successful with these 
dissembling practices. Although there are several empirical studies showing that firms 
increase social disclosures (but only favorable disclosures) in the face of legitimate 
threatening events,136 there are few studies that have empirically tested the effectiveness 
of dissembling strategies. One exception, a study by Bansal and Clelland,137 provides 
some support that dissembling can be an effective way to create the appearance of being 
a socially responsible corporation. Bansal and Clelland find that firms with low 
environmental legitimacy (as measured by negative coverage in the business press) are 
able to reduce their unsystematic stock market risk simply through communications that 
express environmental commitment. Thus, to the extent that corporations are engaging in 
social reporting to mitigate the risk of lost shareholder value, meaningless but positive 
disclosures seem to be a successful strategy. Evidence from studies on impression 
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management 138 and symbolic management139 also provide general support for the 
effectiveness of strategies involving form over substance.  
An additional form over substance problem with the current state of reporting 
under the GRI is that corporations are receiving positive recognition from organizations 
that rank the quality of social reports (often based simply on the amount of disclosure) 
without regard to the firm’s actual social performance. To the extent that a firm’s 
reputation is improved simply by increasing the number of GRI performance indicators it 
reports on—regardless of the quality or accuracy of those disclosures—firms are being 
rewarded for their dissembling. It is also important to note that one study of social reports 
conducted under the 2002 GRI Guidelines and the new G3 Guidelines found that 
companies claimed to be reporting on significantly more of the performance indicators 
than they actually were.140 In a closer look at the auto industry, the study focused on a set 
of indicators that the researchers objectively viewed as the most important for that 
industry, and found that none of the companies’ reports included information on even 
one-half of those indicators and most reported on only one-quarter.141 They obtained this 
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result even though several of the reports were issued by companies that belong to the 
GRI’s working group for that industry.142 
In certain circumstances, the greater the pressure on firms to disclose, the less 
disclosure there is. Hess and Dunfee state: “The greater the public intolerance for 
corporate irresponsibility, the greater the costs to the firm if it discloses negative 
information. This leads to the ironic result that the more stakeholders want information 
and tend to act upon it, the less willing firms are to disclose such information.”143 Using 
an economic analysis, Lyon and Maxwell find support for this claim.144 Their analysis 
shows that “threat of public backlash for greenwash will cause firms to ‘clam up’ rather 
than become more open and transparent.”145 This holds especially for firms that have 
positive information to report but may not fully understand the social and environmental 
impact of their actions.146 The exceptions, as stated earlier, are those poorly performing 
firms that seek to provide positive information to cover up their negative image. It also 
should be noted that empirical studies have shown that voluntary disclosures on 
environmental performance have no relationship to the firm’s actual environmental 
performance.147 Thus, there are additional reasons that we should not assume that those 
firms with high social performance will be the ones most willing to disclose.  
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B. Directing: Failed Dialogue. 
There is evidence that there is a rise in the use of stakeholder dialogues by 
corporations, as one survey found that approximately forty percent of large corporations 
utilize a structured stakeholder dialogue process.148 Critics, however, are quick to point 
out that “stakeholder engagement” often ends up being little more than “stakeholder 
management.”149 Returning to data from the KPMG survey of large corporations, they 
found that in 2005 only thirty-two percent of companies sought feedback from 
stakeholders on their social report, and only eight percent publicly responded to any 
feedback they received.150 This provides additional evidence that meaningful discussions 
on a corporation’s performance as reflected in its social report are very rare. Overall, it 
seems that rather than bringing together all relevant stakeholders for an open-ended 
discussion on the corporation’s progress toward sustainable development and seeking 
consensus on goals and compliance actions, corporations are directing the process to 
limit stakeholder participation and power. Instead of bringing in stakeholders to 
deliberate over the legitimacy of corporate actions, corporations are directing the process 
in such a way that they gain the knowledge they need to assess and then manage those 
legitimacy risks that stakeholders pose the firm.151 With this information from 
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stakeholder dialogues, corporations can attempt to re-frame the debate,152 or simply 
choose to ignore the comments of less-powerful stakeholders.153  
Thus, a core criticism is that stakeholders have no real power to effect change 
from the dialogues.154 Because corporations direct the engagement, the dialogue process 
is stacked in their favor. For example, Conley and Williams argue that ExxonMobil 
manages the process by defining corporate social responsibility in economic terms, which 
makes irrelevant any issues that cannot be directly related to that definition.155 In other 
words, ExxonMobil captures the process and “further legitim[izes] the shareholder-
focused status quo.”156 British American Tobacco (BAT), on the other hand, defines CSR 
as simply open communication with stakeholders. Although BAT opens up the process so 
that their actions may be challenged from any and all stakeholders, its response is simply 
the need for more communication and it commits itself to “nothing more than 
listening.”157 In this case, rather than addressing the conflict, the dialogue process 
smoothes over it. Likewise, Owen et al.158 refer to these actions as “managerial capture,” 
which involves “over-inflated promises of accountability to an all-encompassing and 
essentially meaningless set of stakeholders.” Other academics who have actually 
participated as stakeholders in the engagement process rely on their first-hand experience 
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to argue that the process does not achieve the democratic experimentalist goals of 
stakeholder engagement, which involves the corporation and stakeholders collectively 
coming to a conclusion on certain actions or goals and having the corporation commit to 
a strategy to achieve those ends.159 
Ideally, the disclosure and dialogue pillars should work together, with disclosure 
providing stakeholders with the necessary information to establish a meaningful dialogue 
with corporations and to make demands for improvement that the corporation must 
acknowledge. If stakeholders do not have any power in the process, however, 
corporations may simply do “nothing more than listen.”  
C. Decoupling: Failed Development. 
The moral development pillar requires that corporations meaningfully incorporate 
the social reporting information into their policies and practices. Similar to concerns with 
firms’ implementation of compliance programs to reduce corporate crime or sexual 
harassment, however, there is the concern that the social reporting process is decoupled 
from actual operations (and information flows within the organization) and therefore 
serves only a “symbolic” or “cosmetic” role. In other words, social reporting can serve as 
little more than a superficial public relations strategy. It is important to note that such 
decoupling has the effect of not only creating false appearances to an external audience, 
but also internally.160 
Empirical evidence is starting to emerge that provides evidence of decoupling 
among even those corporations identified as leaders in social reporting. For example, 
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Norris and Innes161 studied four large firms that experts considered social reporting 
leaders and found that the reporting process was conducted in a manner that had no real 
connection to the actual operations of the firm. For all four firms, the researchers found 
that the content of the social report and the performance indicators included within it 
were developed not through the internal management system, but by a self-contained unit 
separated from the organization’s accountants and operational managers. Accordingly, 
they found that managers did not view the social report as in any way affecting their 
decision making. Commentators working in the area of social reporting seem to agree 
with these conclusions based on their experience. One consultant notes how social reports 
rarely discuss how sustainability issues are incorporated into long-term strategy, and 
states that from reading the reports it seems that corporate governance and sustainability 
are two worlds that “never touch one another.”162  
Empirical evidence from other policy domains also shows that decoupling rather 
than moral development is expected. For example, Hironaka and Schofer163 show that 
Environmental Impact Statements—which require government agencies in the United 
States to draft a report on the environmental impact of a proposed action and seek 
feedback from interested parties as a way to encourage improved decision making on 
environmental matters—have largely failed due to decoupling based on the bureaucratic 
focus over the substantive issues. Likewise, Karkkainen summarizes his review of the 
evidence on environmental impact statements by stating that, “Agencies have come to 
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terms with the formal demands of the . . . Environmental Impact Statement requirement 
by routinizing and compartmentalizing their response, effectively marginalizing its 
operative effect and thereby circumventing NEPA's core purpose.”164 Robert Hahn and 
colleagues report a similar conclusion from their empirical analysis of regulatory impact 
analysis reports that government agencies responsible for various environmental, health 
and safety regulations are required to complete.165 Although further research along these 
lines is clearly needed, the United States’ experience with these regulatory initiatives 
does not give one much hope for optimism for the ability of social reports to improve a 
corporation’s moral development. 
VI. Establishing the Pillars 
Ideally, the three pillars should work together to form a highly effective form of 
New Governance regulation. Corporations engaging in dialogues with their stakeholders 
should lead to some form of agreement on certain goals that the corporation should work 
toward. Development ensures that the corporation meaningfully attempts to meet those 
goals by adapting its strategies, operations, and corporate culture. Disclosure allows 
stakeholders to monitor the corporation’s progress toward those agreed-upon goals and 
supports the next round of dialogue that revisits those goals in light of new information 
and experience. Directing, dissembling, and decoupling, however, prevent the social 
reporting process from creating any meaningful improvement in a corporation’s 
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contribution to sustainable economic development. In fact, collectively, these failures 
have the potential to create barriers to the achievement of sustainable enterprises. 
Through the practice of social reporting, corporations signal to their stakeholders 
and society at large that they are meeting societal expectations of sustainable 
development and that further regulation is unnecessary. The signal and reality, however, 
are likely significantly different.166 Thus, rather than using the social reporting process to 
identify stakeholder concerns, correct wrongs, and implement policies and practices 
consistent with the public’s emerging views on sustainability, most firms are using the 
process to identify risks that need to be managed to protect the reputation of the firm.167 
Through social reporting, firms are purchasing the commodity of corporate social 
responsibility, which protects their reputation. With this protection, there is the real 
potential that firms can then continue business as usual or worse.168 
As mentioned earlier, many may argue that non-market and market actors will 
learn to recognize poorly implemented social reports, and eventually be able to force 
corporations to change their ways. Evidence from organization theory, however, is not 
promising. For example, Zajac and Westphal169 studied the curious phenomenon of 
corporations receiving market benefits from announced stock repurchase plans that were 
never implemented. Even with ample evidence of these practices, the markets did not 
“learn” and instead followed prevailing institutional logic. Likewise, some commentators 
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have argued that we should stop giving awards for “best practices” in social reporting, 
and only give awards for actual performance. The concern is that an institutional logic is 
developing that a corporation having a high-quality social report is the equivalent of that 
corporation being socially responsible.  
As an illustration, consider again British American Tobacco and their apparent 
policy of stakeholder disagreement with their practices simply requiring the need for 
more communication. Conley and Williams report that British American Tobacco 
representatives were among the “stars” at the 2003 Business for Social Responsibility 
annual meeting. The authors—conducting an ethnographic study of the CSR field—
observed that there was “universal praise for BAT’s engagement of stakeholders.”170 
Likewise, a review of social reports issued in 2004 ranked BAT as having the fourth-best 
social report behind such firms as BP and NovoNordisk.171 The accolades were bestowed 
upon BAT despite the concerns of many that their social reports did not adequately 
address their major impacts on society, such as the harmful health effects of their product 
and their highly criticized marketing practices.172 Moerman and Van Der Lan claim that 
BAT’s social reporting is simply a “smoke and mirrors” attempt to gain legitimacy, but 
the entire project (including the external auditing) is focused solely on the process 
without any impact on the substance of what the corporation does.173 
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There are potential solutions for the problems of each individual pillar. Disclosure 
can be improved through standardization of performance indicators and mandatory 
reporting requirements. Dialogue can be improved by looking to political science 
research on deliberative democracy and perhaps implementing an industry-by-industry, 
or issue-by-issue forum that allows stakeholders to have a meaningful say in the 
performance standards corporations are expected to report on. These dialogues are 
occurring in such areas as international labor, but they go beyond extant social reporting 
practices. Development could be improved by requiring certain information 
dissemination practices and dialogues within the corporation. As we work through any of 
the proposed solutions, however, we must realize that a solution for any one pillar could 
have unintended negative consequences for another pillar. For example, standardization 
of disclosure requirements could result in the belief of disclosure as the end goal and 
work against the creation of processes within the corporation that will improve moral 
development. Thus, one goal of this paper is to set out the three requirements for social 
reporting under a New Governance perspective so that future researchers, policymakers, 
and others can begin to better understand the relationships between the pillars and the 
trade-offs that may have to be made to improve any individual pillar. In the next section, 
though, I provide a brief description of one possible solution to improve the effectiveness 
of social reporting overall by focusing primarily on making improvements in just one 
pillar but recognizing how it will impact the other pillars. 
A. Finding a Solution: Is Mandatory Reporting the Answer? 
To move from an aspirational goal of the ideal social report based on these three 
pillars to a realistic goal of improving the social performance of some meaningful 
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number of corporations, I propose that we need an approach that relies upon disclosure as 
the foundation of both dialogue and development. That approach is mandatory social 
reporting with standardized indicators and third-party assurance. This improves the 
disclosure pillar most immediately by increasing the number of social reporters and 
ensuring that all reporters report on all performance indicators. Currently, high-profile 
firms that depend on their brand name and firms that belong to controversial industries 
are the most common issuers of social reports. This limits the potential of social 
reporting. Making disclosure mandatory can lead to more firms—including those 
virtually unknown to the general public—to change their behavior, such as has happened 
with the TRI.174 
To overcome the problem of firms’ issuing social reports that simply provide 
positive information, standardized reporting guidelines should reduce this strategic 
behavior by providing a list of required indicators, such as a selection of the GRI’s 
performance indicators. By requiring corporations to disclose on all indicators, firms 
cannot selectively choose their indicators. In addition, users of the reports can put the 
numbers in context by being able to more easily compare corporations. Currently, 
reporting on all the GRI indicators is voluntary, even for corporations choosing to report 
under those guidelines. Corporations using the GRI guidelines but not reporting on all 
indicators are required to indicate that is the case by self-declaring an application level of 
A, B, or C. The categories of compliance with the GRI’s indicators should make it more 
apparent to stakeholders when firms are only selectively disclosing. If stakeholders then 
assume that non-disclosing firms are hiding poor performance and those firms are 
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somehow punished for that poor performance, then an unraveling process should occur 
where top performers disclose to avoid being perceived in a negative light, which is then 
followed by a round of disclosures by the next best performers and so on. As shown by 
Hess and Dunfee,175 however, under the current voluntary reporting regime, this 
unraveling process is unlikely to occur, or if it begins, it is unlikely to unravel past just 
the handful of top performers. In addition, recent research on social reports conducted 
under the GRI found that the application level has simply caused companies to claim they 
reported on more indicators than they actually did.176 
As these last comments show, there is always the foundational problem of simply 
getting some critical mass of corporations to issue social reports in compliance with 
established guidelines, such as the GRI. There is natural resistance that is difficult to 
overcome. Managers may resist commitment to guidelines because they will lose control 
of the social reporting process as the GRI guidelines evolve over time. For example, with 
respect to social responsibility standards in general, one senior executive told the 
Conference Board, “We don’t want to get sucked into a morass. We don’t want to find 
that after we have been challenged for an endorsement that the standards have changed 
and they get defined as something other than our original commitment.”177 Suggestive of 
the failure of a voluntary reporting system to produce a significant number of reporters—
let alone reporters that disclose on all indicators in the GRI—is the recent study 
commissioned by the United Nations which predicts that by 2020 fewer than six percent 
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of multinational corporations will issue a social report.178 That number of course counts 
all multinationals, and not just large ones, but consider also the case of the United States. 
Of the 100 largest corporations in the US, 32 percent issued a stand-alone social report in 
2005.179 This is a significant decrease from 1996 (44 percent) but not significantly 
different from levels in 1999 (30 percent) and 2002 (36 percent).180 Likewise, a more 
recent study found that from April 2005 to March 2007, only 29 percent of the 545 
largest corporations in the United States disclosed nonfinancial information in some 
format (that is, this number includes disclosures in the annual report).181 Overall, the 
trends do not suggest that we will see a critical mass of social reporters any time soon.  
One objection to making social reporting mandatory is that it is still too early in 
our experience with social reporting to determine the content of those standardized 
indicators. A mandatory system does not need to be static, however, and the indicators do 
not need to be perfect at the initial stage. Most successful transparency-based regulatory 
programs in the United States (including financial reporting) started out far from perfect 
and instead were the result of political compromise.182 Those programs improved over 
time, however, because they provided benefits to users (and some disclosers) who then 
pushed for improvements. Currently, due to the poor quality of social reports, pressure 
for improved reporting could easily start to decline, and perhaps already has. Some 
NGOs have stopped focusing efforts on pushing corporations to issue social reports 
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because it diverts the NGO’s resources and attention away from other ways where they 
can be more effective.183 Other NGOs state they have stopped looking at social reports 
because they need to look at what companies are actually doing.184 Investors resort to 
directly surveying corporations,185 because they find social reports focus too much on 
attitudes and intentions and not enough on substantive information.186  
 To improve the benefits to current users and put us on the path to sustainable 
sustainability reports, the standardized indicators should be developed based on the needs 
of the actual expected users of the reports, such as investors or well-recognized NGOs, 
rather than indicators that may be more easily digested by non-specialist users. This user-
focused approach is needed to create the potential for real benefits (and reduced costs) for 
those that will actually use the information. Even though these users may require more 
detailed and specific information than the GRI’s “clarity” principle requires for other 
stakeholders, this approach is necessary to ensure that there is a driving force for social 
reports. To meet the needs of those stakeholders, other groups (which can be termed 
“infomediaries”) will process the information and put it into a context and form that 
provides those stakeholders with more and better information in the end (as was the case 
with the TRI).187 In addition, standardized indicators also will provide some benefits to 
those corporations that can distinguish themselves from their competitors—which are 
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companies that are now forced to provide full disclosure on the standardized and 
comparable indicators—and they may also potentially press for improvements in the 
mandatory standards. Overall, mandatory reporting with indicators developed based on 
the needs of certain sophisticated users leads to more information on more corporations, 
and through the likely actions of infomediaries, more useful information for all 
stakeholders. 
The improved disclosure pillar (in terms of the number of firms reporting and the 
usefulness of the information to users) should lead to improvements in the other two 
pillars. Dialogue will improve because stakeholders will now actually have access to 
information they can use. This reduces the power imbalances that allowed corporations to 
direct dialogues. In addition, it improves the quality of the dialogues. The corporation and 
its stakeholders can back up their claims of responsibility or irresponsibility with actual 
data rather than “anecdotal accounts or politically motivated claims and public relations 
counterclaims.”188 In addition, in an environment where the claims of corporations and 
interested stakeholders must be backed up with credible evidence, then “the demands of 
activists and the responses of corporations become more reasonable . . . because that is 
what public credibility demands.”189 This data also allows stakeholders to more 
effectively develop solutions to problems that they can bring to corporations as part of the 
dialogue.  
Improving the disclosure pillar also supports the development pillar. By being 
forced to produce certain information, top management, as well as all members of the 
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organization, will be forced to confront the reality of their performance. Moreover, 
external stakeholders’ claims of a corporation’s irresponsibility compared to others will 
be credibly backed up with data. For companies that profess to be socially responsible to 
at least some degree, these external claims create a conflict between the company’s image 
to outsiders and their identity as a responsible firm. As shown by organization theory 
scholars, this conflict can force the company to change to improve its image.190 This 
internal pressure for change can be instigated by members at any level of the organization 
that feel a conflict with their identity.191 Overall, this supports what Sonenshein refers to 
“internal social criticism,” which is the moral development of the corporation from the 
inside and not just in response to external pressures.192 It is also important to note that 
mandatory reporting does not prevent current social reporters from continuing to 
experiment and develop performance indicators that are more appropriate for internal use. 
In fact, mandatory reporting can support a bottom-up push for such activity by granting 
legitimacy to the ideas of social accounting, auditing, and reporting.  
B. Objections and Reponses to Mandatory Reporting 
As an initial matter, it is important to deal with one common response to 
proposals for mandatory reporting, which is that improved assurance of social reports 
will achieve the same (or better) results under a voluntary system. The idea is that 
although current reports may not be of great quality, the poor quality and lack of 
credibility will lead to pressures to audit social reports. Over time, improvements in the 
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quality of assurance standards and service providers will improve social reports, since 
corporations will not be able to engage in dissembling or ignoring the legitimate concerns 
of stakeholders (directing).  
There are strong reasons to be skeptical of these claims. First, there are issues 
with respect to the quality of assurance. In general, many argue that current practices 
focus simply on ensuring the accuracy of data rather than focusing on the quality of 
stakeholder engagement and the completeness of the report.193 One study found that even 
among those social reports selected for awards in Europe for their quality, the external 
assurance that was conducted rarely involved interviewing stakeholders or providing an 
opinion on the extent to which the company attempts to respond to the concerns raised by 
stakeholders in strategy and operations decisions.194 Second, even if the quality of 
assurance continues to improve under such standards as AA1000, few corporations are 
seeking external assurance of their reports. KPMG reports that only 30 percent of the 
Global 250 used external assurance in 2005, which is essentially the same as in 2002 
when 29 percent used such assurance.195 In the United States, only 1 of 32 companies in 
the KPMG study reported use of external assurance.196 Likewise, a 2006 study of 64 of 
the largest corporations in the world found that only 20% used at least a minimal level of 
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external assurance.197 One review of the various surveys on external assurance found that 
its use is actually slowing down and perhaps even declining.198 Part of the reason may be 
the lack of trust that external stakeholders have in those conducting the assurance.199 
Thus, not only is there ample work to be done to increase the number of corporations 
issuing social reports under a voluntary system (which improved auditing will not affect, 
because, as discussed above, an unraveling effect is unlikely), we must also get existing 
reporters, as well as any new reporters, to begin assuring their reports. A mandatory 
approach immediately increases the number of reporters and the use of assurance. Such 
an approach, of course, comes at the cost of flexibility. I now turn to that criticism and 
others. 
Critics have consistently pointed out the potential downsides of mandatory 
reporting with standardized indicators. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
for example, argues strongly against standardization and mandatory requirements by 
claiming that the current “voluntary and flexible” approach will “further innovation and 
experimentation.”200 The ICC also argues that: 
 A prescriptive approach may even discourage companies from pursuing a 
dialogue with stakeholders on corporate responsibility and from giving 
due consideration to what is important to the business and, instead, nudge 
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them toward choosing a lowest common denominator or "tick-the-box" 
approach to complying with mandated reporting requirements. As a result, 
regulatory requirements on non-financial reporting will almost certainly 
lead to reports that will be of little or no value to the wide range of 
stakeholder audiences. 
 
The ICC is arguing that a mandatory disclosure requirement will turn social 
reporting into a meaningless, pro forma exercise that has little relation to the needs of the 
company or its stakeholders in working toward sustainable development—much like the 
above critique of environmental impact statements. Thus, the ICC would argue, even 
though a mandatory requirement would immediately increase the number of reporters 
significantly,201 those reports would be of such limited value to corporations and 
stakeholders that society would be better off (in the long run) allowing corporations to 
voluntarily choose whether and how to participate. Breaking down the analysis of social 
reporting into the three pillars identified here helps us understand how mandatory 
requirements should not lead to such a result if they are appropriately structured, and in 
the long run should do more for the goal of sustainable development than a voluntary 
approach.  
First, as discussed above, based on the United States’ experience with other 
mandatory transparency programs, there is reason to believe that a mandatory system 
focused on the information needs of actual users of the reports will result in a cycle that 
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puts social reporting on a path of continuous improvement. Thus, a mandatory approach 
does not stop social reporting at a certain point in time, but puts us on a path where 
stakeholders and certain corporations will demand more useful reports. Second, with 
actual information on a variety of corporations and an ability to benchmark the 
performance of any corporation against others, stakeholders will be empowered to open 
up dialogues with more corporations, rather than waiting for corporations to approach 
them. Third, requiring report indicators to be based on the needs of sophisticated users—
rather than be accessible to any member of the general public—helps alleviate the 
concerns of over-simplification leading to reports that are not of use to anyone. Fourth, 
mandatory legislation legitimizes the public’s right to this information and can provide 
stakeholders with better standing to demand additional information related to a specific 
concern that is not otherwise covered by a mandated indicator. This legitimacy granted to 
social reporting should not prevent, and would likely encourage, experimentation with 
better social reporting practices. A mandatory social reporting requirement should be 
drafted in such a manner that it is consistent with initiatives such as the GRI. The 
mandated indicators may go beyond the GRI requirements in some areas and in other 
areas not require disclosure, but overall they should be generally consistent. This would 
allow the handful of companies that are leaders today in social reporting to continue 
easily to go “beyond compliance” and produce more complete social reports than 
required by law. Overall, a properly structured mandatory requirement will likely cause 
stakeholders to demand information beyond the mandated indicators and may provide 
many corporations with incentives to voluntarily disclose more information as a way to 
provide a complete picture of their performance (if they believe that the mandated 
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indicators create a skewed picture). This will encourage continued experimentation and 
provide a greater wealth of experience upon which to improve performance indicators 
and other report content over time.  
The critics are right that there may still be situations where a corporation may 
focus on improving its performance on matters related to a mandated performance 
indicator when that company could have a greater impact on society by focusing its 
efforts on a matter that is not directly tied to a mandated performance indicator. However, 
based on the factors just listed, this seems to be a risk that can be mitigated significantly 
and is a risk that does not outweigh the benefits achieved by mandated disclosure, 
including getting more companies to focus seriously on at least some of these issues in 
the first place. 
A final criticism against this proposal would come not from the business 
community, but from those seeking a more radical version of corporate social 
responsibility and true stakeholder democracy. Although my proposal would focus 
primarily on the needs of investment community members and large NGOs, the 
information produced is a public good that can be used in any market or political arena by 
anyone. Here, again, the role of infomediaries is important, and additional policy 
initiatives to improve the development and functioning of such groups could be useful. 
As we consider the continued development of guidelines such as the Global 
Reporting Initiatives, there needs to be a clear understanding of the trade-offs we make 
when seeking to improve disclosure, dialogue, or development-based aspects of the social 
reporting process, as well as the potential pitfalls if we try to achieve all three 
simultaneously. Here, mandatory reporting with indicators based on the needs of 
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sophisticated users does require some short-term trade-offs with the dialogue and 
development pillars. Ultimately, however, the benefits of more corporations providing 
more useful information to stakeholders, as well as the benefits of greater experience with 
social reporting should lead to greater progress toward the goal of sustainable 
development. Mandating the disclosure pillar does not hamper the voluntary development 
of the other two pillars and seems only to enhance it. 
VII. Conclusion 
Sustainable development requires corporations to make certain trade-offs between 
their social, environmental, and economic goals. That decision depends on the 
corporation’s unique situation (e.g., market environment and organizational capabilities), 
but traditional regulation can only set minimal standards for all corporations regardless of 
those differences. Mandatory reporting as a form of New Governance regulation allows 
for variation in performance (e.g., those that can do more based on their capabilities and 
resource constraints should do more) but also seeks a continuous ratcheting-up of what 
acceptable performance should be for all corporations. If implemented appropriately, 
social reporting as a form of democratic experimentalist New Governance regulation can 
be more effective in placing all corporations on the road to sustainable development than 
a model focused exclusively on continually expanding the reach of traditional regulation 
or a model relying on voluntary initiatives by corporations. If not implemented 
appropriately, however, social reporting can distract attention from other forms of 
regulation that would be more effective, and society will actually be worse off. It is 
important to remember that proposal advocated here—mandating sustainability reports—
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is not a return to command-and-control regulation, since the only thing that is mandated 
is the disclosure of information and not performance outcomes. 
Social reporting can be viewed as a cycle, where dialogue with stakeholders 
establishes expectations of legitimate corporate goals related to sustainable development, 
followed by the corporation working to meet those goals as well as internalizing those 
values through moral development, followed by disclosure of its performance, and then 
the dialogue begins again. The ideal social reporting process will successfully combine 
all three pillars, and perhaps some corporations will achieve, or have already achieved, 
that goal. However, it seems unlikely that many corporations will, or will even try, under 
our current voluntary system. Under the current system, the corporation decides what 
information and what quality of information to disclose (dissembling), who to talk to and 
what they will talk about (directing), and whether or not to actually implement practices 
and policies it has committed to (decoupling). To the extent that social reporting remains 
voluntary and a “business case” is necessary for firms to engage in the practice, then the 
potential for managerial capture remains high.202 As briefly outlined above, I propose a 
mandatory disclosure system as the best approach to meeting the demands of all three 
pillars in the long term.  
We are clearly still in the early stages of social reporting. Although the concept 
has been around for decades, it is only within the past few years that these reports have 
become a more common—and potentially mainstream— practice. With the GRI 
Guidelines quickly becoming the de facto standard, there needs to be serious 
consideration of whether or not those standards under a voluntary approach are putting 
                                                 
202 See Owen et al, supra note 149. 
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social reporting on the path to disclosure, development, dialogue; or a path to directing, 
decoupling, and dissembling. As the shaping of social reporting practice continues to 
develop and we move toward either accountability or capture, there are many questions 
that must be addressed. Within the accounting literature there are numerous scholars 
conducting valuable empirical research on these issues. Hopefully, more scholars from 
other disciplines, such as the fields of management and law and society, will join these 
efforts and provide additional perspectives on some of the issues I have raised in this 
paper. 
